March 26, 2023

The Honorable Miguel Cardona
Secretary of Education
U.S. Department of Education
400 Maryland Avenue, SW
Washington, D.C. 20202

Dear Secretary Cardona,

I am writing in response to the Department of Education’s (the Department) efforts to transform the income-driven repayment program and identify low financial value programs at institutions of higher education.1 Further, I support the Department’s continuation to make improvements to the federal student loan program and hold institutions of higher education accountable—including reestablishing the Office of Enforcement in the Office of Federal Student Aid to conduct oversight of bad actors in the higher education industry2 and withdrawing accreditation authorization for the Accrediting Council for Independent Colleges and Schools due to its repeated failures to fulfill its watchdog role.3

The Department, however, should not stop there. As I offer support for your effort to identify low financial value programs that saddle students with mountains of debt that they have little hope of repaying, I also write to bring to your attention several other areas where the Department can and should strengthen accountability and oversight of institutions of higher education that too often leave students with insurmountable debts. Specifically, the Department should take the following actions:

1) Ensure that institutions that fall below standards are subject to provisional Program Participation Agreements that set out strong corrective conditions with closely supervised, measurable benchmarks for improvement, and that schools that fail to improve see their Title IV funding revoked.

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2) Strengthen enforcement of for-profit colleges’ manipulation of cohort default rates.

3) Review college conversions to ensure “covert for-profit” colleges are not redirecting funds to benefit private parties at the expense of students.

4) Use its authority to protect students and taxpayers and promote accountability by holding for-profit college owners and executives personally financially liable when the colleges they run fail or lie to students who take on massive student loan debts.

5) Improve oversight of online program management companies and their incentive compensation arrangements with colleges.

6) Conduct more stringent oversight of school accreditors, including terminating Department recognition of accreditors to protect students and taxpayers if necessary.

7) Conduct fair lending risk assessments and ensure all stakeholders in the federal financial aid programs are complying with fair lending and civil rights laws.

8) Rapidly re-institute and strengthen Gainful Employment rules, and ensure that low-quality programs are swiftly held accountable to prevent further financial harm to students who may end up in low-wage jobs or with debts that are not affordable relative to their actual incomes.

The remainder of this letter provides additional detail on the need for these actions and the benefits they will have for students.

1. **Program Participation Agreements (PPAs)**

   PPAs define the terms and conditions that higher education institutions must meet to participate in Title IV programs.\(^4\) PPAs essentially serve as a contract in which an institution commits to meeting federal standards related to financial responsibility and administrative capability to protect the interests of its students.\(^5\) However, far too many predatory for-profit institutions have harvested money from their students and federal tax dollars without upholding the standards for federal aid they promised to provide.\(^6\)

   In particular, the Department has failed to effectively utilize provisional PPAs as a tool to ensure that schools remain accountable. Provisional PPAs allow schools that have fallen below standards to continue receiving federal aid as long as they agree to correct their problems and...
come back into compliance. For example, even though the Center for Excellence in Higher Education (CEHE) was subject to probationary status through a provisional PPA for several years, CEHE still was able to collect billions of taxpayer dollars before closing overnight without any warning to students.

Moreover, the Department rarely has used its authority to revoke PPAs for substantial misrepresentations, even though many schools have been found to have defrauded students and otherwise violated federal standards. In 1999, six years after Congress granted the Department the authority to use provisional PPAs, the Department’s Office of the Inspector General (OIG) conducted a review of the effectiveness of provisional PPAs in managing “at-risk schools who may fail to take corrective action.” The OIG’s review found that it was impossible to evaluate the effectiveness of provisional PPAs because not a single provisional PPA was revoked by the Department in those six years despite evidence that institutions violated federal standards. Alarming, nearly 22 years after the OIG review, the Department apparently has still not revoked a single provisional PPA, despite the OIG’s 1999 recommendation that the Department appropriately utilize its revocation authority.

The Department has an opportunity to strengthen and enforce accountability by ensuring that institutions that fall below standards are subject to provisional PPAs that set out strong corrective conditions with measurable benchmarks for improvement. The Department also should closely supervise schools on provisional PPA status to ensure they are taking steps to improve while receiving federal aid and ensure that schools that fail to improve see their Title IV funding revoked.

2. For-Profit & Predatory Schools

I am glad to see the Department taking steps to prevent predatory and deceptive practices by for-profit institutions, including strengthening requirements for for-profit institutions seeking to convert to nonprofit status. When implemented, these actions would ensure that efforts by for-profit colleges attempting to convert to nonprofit status are genuine changes and not maneuvers to avoid accountability to students and taxpayers.

For-profit colleges have a long record of engaging in deceptive and manipulative practices and aggressively recruiting vulnerable students into low quality, high-cost education and training programs that leave students with high amounts of student loan debt and a greater likelihood to

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7 Id.
8 Id.
9 Id.
10 Id.
11 Id.
12 Id.
default on their loans.\textsuperscript{14} Although for-profit colleges enroll only 5 percent of students,\textsuperscript{15} they account for nearly a quarter of all student loan defaults.\textsuperscript{16} More than 66 percent of students enrolled in for-profit colleges for the 2015-16 school year took out federal loans, compared to 55 percent at four-year public schools.\textsuperscript{17}

The dismal employment outcomes of students enrolled at for-profit colleges contradict any justification for the higher expenses they charge. Even when compared to high school graduates who did not pursue a postsecondary education, there is no evidence that students who graduate from for-profit colleges with associate degrees have higher earnings.\textsuperscript{18} The outcomes for Black and Latino students at for-profit colleges are even more striking. Roughly two-thirds of Black and Latino borrowers drop out of four year for-profit schools.\textsuperscript{19} Nearly 60 percent of Black students who took on student debt to attend a for-profit school in 2004 defaulted on their loans by 2016, compared to only 36 percent of their white peers.\textsuperscript{20}

Federal law requires the Department to use Cohort Default Rates (CDR), which measures an institution’s share of their federal student loan borrowers who default after entering repayment, to evaluate a college’s eligibility to participate in federal student aid programs.\textsuperscript{21} Predatory for-profit schools, however, have been caught manipulating CDR data to avoid federal accountability.\textsuperscript{22}

In 2012, the U.S. Senate Committee on Health, Education, Labor and Pensions (HELP) launched an investigation that found for-profit colleges used specialized contractors to steer students away from defaulting and towards forbearance without regard for the financial interest

\textsuperscript{17} The Urban Institute, “Borrowing,” 2016, https://collegeaffordability.urban.org/covering-expenses/borrowing/.
\textsuperscript{20} The Brookings Institute, “The for-profit college system is broken and the Biden administration needs to fix it,” Ariel Gelrud Shiro and Richard V. Reeves, January 12, 2021, https://www.brookings.edu/blog/how-we-rise/2021/01/12/the-for-profit-college-system-is-broken-and-the-biden-administration-needs-to-fix-it/.
\textsuperscript{22} Student Borrower Protection Center, “A Shadow Industry is Manipulating Student Loan Borrowers’ Default Rates—It’s Time to Stop these Practices,” Tariq Habash, December 10, 2020 https://protectborrowers.org/cdr_blog/.
of the borrower.\textsuperscript{23} The HELP investigation found that the for-profit chains Kaplan University, Bridgepoint Education, ITT Technical Institute (ITT), and the University of Phoenix contracted with “default prevention companies” to steer borrowers at risk of default towards forbearance rather than help students access affordable loan repayment plans as a way to lower their CDR.\textsuperscript{24} Further, the investigation found an internal presentation from the for-profit school chain, Education Management Corporation, which encouraged staff to, “Get comfortable with doing a verbal forbearance!!,” and, “DON’T B AFRAID-KEEP CALLING and KEEP CALLING LET THEM KNOW THIS IS NOT GOING TO GO AWAY.”\textsuperscript{25} A 2018 Government Accountability Office (GAO) report further called attention to the prevalence of CDR manipulation and the need for improved oversight of schools to prevent this practice.\textsuperscript{26} Therefore, the Department should address these concerns by scrutinizing and halting unlawful CDR manipulation practices and strengthen enforcement when for-profits manipulate CDR.

3. School Owners & Personal Financial Liability

For too long, executives and owners of for-profit colleges have not been held accountable for scamming students out of a high-quality education and burdening them with huge amounts of debt while continuing to take in huge profits. In the 1992 reauthorization of the Higher Education Act (HEA), Congress gave the Department the authority to hold leaders of fraudulent colleges personally liable.\textsuperscript{27} Specifically, the HEA explicitly authorizes the Department “to the extent necessary to protect the financial interest of the United States” and recover any financial losses from people who “exercise substantial control” over institutions of higher education, including owners, board members, CEOs, and other executives.\textsuperscript{28} These authorities establish Congress’ clear directive that taxpayers should not bear the burden when an institution fails to meet its obligations to students, taxpayers, and the government. However, in the three decades since the reauthorization, the Department rarely has exercised this power over for-profit executives and owners of for-profit colleges.\textsuperscript{29} This inaction continued even as Corinthian Colleges’ executives were paid nearly $1 million in bonuses weeks before its disastrous collapse\textsuperscript{30} and while Kevin Modany, the CEO of ITT, made more than $7.5 million from his salary, bonuses, and stocks in

\textsuperscript{27} 20 U.S.C. § 1099c(e)
\textsuperscript{28} Id.
\textsuperscript{29} Id.
2009, at a time when many Americans were grappling with the economic impacts of the Great Recession.  

In October 2020, Senators Hassan, Murphy, and I sent the Department a letter outlining the importance of holding executives at predatory for-profit colleges personally liable for their schools’ failings. In October 2022, Senators Durbin, Blumenthal, Baldwin, Booker, Hirono, and I sent the Department another letter urging it to work swiftly to leverage its authority to better hold for-profit college executives accountable. I will reiterate these calls for the Department to use its statutory authority to protect students and taxpayers and promote accountability by holding for-profit college owners and executives personally financially liable. I applaud the Department for updating steps last year to ensure that even when a school closes, the Department can recover funds from entities that had ownership interest in the school instead of leaving the bill to taxpayers, students, or borrowers. Further, I support the Department’s recently released guidance that clarifies how it will implement Section 498(e) of the Higher Education Act, which outlines the authority of the Department to require college owners and operators at private institutions to assume personal liability.

4. Online Program Management Companies

The Online Program Management (OPM) market has grown significantly over the past decade with at least 550 colleges working with OPM providers. OPMs partner with colleges to support their online programs, including recruitment, marketing, and course development, in exchange for a share of the programs’ revenue. These partnerships are becoming more integral to university finances and operations. One report in 2021 found that some institutions are relying

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37 Id.
on OPMs for as much as 40 to 50 percent of their total enrollment.\textsuperscript{38} A reliance on OPM partnerships to generate revenue likely will continue as public and private nonprofit colleges recover from a drop in undergraduate enrollment caused by the COVID-19 pandemic.\textsuperscript{39} I previously have raised questions about these revenue-share agreements because of concerns that some OPM companies are failing to comply with federal law and are contributing to rapidly rising college costs.\textsuperscript{40}

The increasing prevalence of online learning and higher education institutions relying on OPMs to manage their online courses raises concerns about predatory practices used by OPMs that contribute to rising student debt loads. In 2020, Senator Brown and I sent letters to leading OPMs, requesting information on their relationships with schools.\textsuperscript{41} The responses received confirmed that OPMs often have tuition-sharing arrangements with universities, which commit an ongoing percentage of tuition revenue to the OPM to finance the start-up and ongoing costs of operating online degree programs.\textsuperscript{42}

In these situations, OPMs exploit a loophole in the Higher Education Act that prohibits institutions from providing “commission, bonus, or other incentive payment based directly or indirectly on success in securing enrollments or financial aid to any persons or entities engaged in any student recruiting or admission activities.”\textsuperscript{43} The prohibitive policy is known as incentive compensation, which third party entities, such as OPMs, were excluded from through a 2011 guidance issued by the Department.\textsuperscript{44} This 2011 guidance created an exemption for bundled services, allowing tuition-sharing so long as the OPM firm provides a range of services (such as technological support, marketing, and advising) and that payment to the firm covers all services

\textsuperscript{43} Penn State University, College of Education, “Examining the OPM,” John J. Cheslock, Kevin Kinser, Sarah T. Zipf, and Eunjong Ra, December 2021, p. 32, https://osf.io/py3sz/download; Higher Education Act, 34 C.F.R. § 668.14
This loophole incentivizes OPMs to aggressively recruit students in order to boost their revenue, including calling prospective students multiple times a day, encouraging students with low academic GPAs to apply and take out federal Grad Plus loans that allow students to borrow as much as colleges charge. These practices often disproportionately lure more students from low-income backgrounds into enrolling in high-debt programs with false promises of increased earnings. Although colleges work with OPMs to support programs eligible for federal student aid, there is a lack of transparency regarding the payment arrangements made with OPM providers.

Since issuing the 2011 guidance, the number of students recruited and enrolled by online programs using the bundled service exemption has increased. The GAO recently published a report on OPMs, finding that the Department has failed to sufficiently scrutinize OPM arrangements despite the significant federal funding that supports OPMs. I applaud the Department’s recent launch of a review on the impact of its 2011 incentive compensation guidance. The Department should reverse the 2011 decision to exempt OPMs using bundled service agreements from the incentive compensation ban if it finds that the exemption has led to violations in federal law.

Ultimately, given the growth in online enrollment and associated federal student debt, the Department immediately should strengthen its enforcement against OPM companies that are clearly overstepping the rules, and signal to the industry that its practices will be more heavily scrutinized going forward.

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47 Id.
5. Accreditor Accountability

College accreditors are the cornerstone of the nation’s higher education quality assurance system, serving as a critical gatekeepers to the over $120 billion in federal student loan investments.\(^{52}\) However, a lack of accountability and poor oversight have allowed poor performing and even fraudulent colleges to flourish at the expense of students and taxpayers, leading the *Wall Street Journal* to call college accreditors “watchdogs of college education [that] rarely bite.”\(^{53}\)

The Department has made significant strides to protect against a “race to the bottom” in quality standards by restoring the public dashboards of accreditor outcomes, combatting “Accreditor Shopping” to prevent institutions from seeking accreditation through agencies with less rigorous standards, and clarifying expectations for accrediting agencies when evaluating schools and programs for recognition.\(^{54}\) These changes are intended to ensure accrediting agencies are holding themselves and the institutions they review to a higher standard.\(^{55}\) Therefore, I support the Department’s actions to provide increased transparency around the accreditation process by publishing reviews of accrediting agencies and accreditation performance ahead of National Advisory Committee on Institutional Quality and Integrity (NACIQI) meetings.\(^{56}\) The Department should build on these steps by disaggregating outcomes data by race & ethnicity in public dashboards, and also including accreditors’ responses to the Department’s inquiries and internal evaluations of accreditor compliance and making them available for the public and members of NACIQI to review on an even timelier basis.

I am supportive of the Department taking action this past August to protect students and taxpayers by rejecting an appeal from the Accrediting Council for Independent Colleges and Schools (ACICS) to remain operational after finding that the council was incapable of meeting federal standards.\(^{57}\) From February 28 March 2, 2023, NACIQI held a review of several large accreditation agencies as part of the Department’s accreditor federal recognition process.\(^{58}\) As the Department continues to review these accreditors, I ask for transparency as it relates to

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\(^{52}\) The Department of Education, “Federal Student Aid,” https://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/fsa/index.html.


\(^{55}\) Id.


document releases and complain procedures in the process of reviewing accreditors’ applications for renewal of recognition to hold agencies with track records of approving institutions with bad student outcomes accountable. I am particularly concerned with the Higher Learning Commission (HLC), which accredits 507 public institutions, 397 private nonprofit institutions, and 26 for-profit institutions, continues to accredit a high number of colleges whose graduates earn less than the typical high school graduate six years after enrolling in the institution. In January 2022, Veterans Education Success wrote to the Department to provide evidence that HLC failed to meet its obligations under the statutory standards outlined in the Higher Education Act, including an inability to detect institutional abuses and the wide prevalence of unacceptable student outcomes at the institutions it accredits. The Department is obligated to conduct stringent oversight of school accreditors to assure adequate educational quality, including taking punitive action to terminate Department recognition of accreditors to protect students and taxpayers if necessary.

Finally, the Department also should carefully consider who will fill future vacancies on the NACIQI advisory board and ensure members are selected on the basis of integrity, impartiality, and good judgment. Members previously have written to the Department on multiple occasions to ensure that conflicts of interest, especially in cases of covert for-profit conversions to non-profit entities, do not usurp the integrity of the accreditation process. It is imperative for the Department to heed these calls. Further, the Department should require NACIQI members to obtain additional training on how evolving regulations should influence their decision-making when reviewing accrediting agencies, assess the frequency of accreditor review (including unannounced site visits and interim monitoring), and integrate public comment and student outcomes more fully into the accreditation review process.

6. Transparency of the Student Loan Portfolio

The Department took a critical step toward improving the College Scorecard early last year with the inclusion of data on institutional-level post-graduation earnings, loan repayment rates, and other metrics that will help consumers make better-informed choices about where to enroll and draw attention to the institutions that leave students without good jobs and mountains of debt. The Department should build on this increased transparency by releasing more data on the scale and status of its student loan portfolio and student outcomes at the institutional-level, including data on loan default rates, repayment rates, financial responsibility scores, and forbearance status. Further, I applaud the Department’s announcement of its first-ever Chief Economist.

President Biden’s announcement to make proposed changes to Income-Driven Repayment (IDR) plans will provide another powerful metric for assessing the overall student loan portfolio. The newly proposed IDR plan, which was announced in January 2023, will allow undergraduate borrowers to pay no more than 5 percent of their monthly discretionary income on undergraduate loans and raise the amount of income that is considered non-discretionary and is consequently protected from repayment. Under this proposed rule, no borrower earning under 225 percent of the federal poverty level would have to make a monthly payment. When this rule is finalized and implemented, the Department should collect and publish information from institutions on their percentage of graduates who make $0 monthly payments. This information can be useful to borrowers in determining the return on investment of an educational institution.

7. Civil Rights & Fair Lending Laws

Higher education experts and advocates have raised concerns that lenders’ use of educational data to make credit decisions could result in discrimination. A 2020 study by the Student Borrower Protection Center (SBPC) found that lenders charge borrowers who attend community colleges, Historically Black Colleges and Universities (HBCUs), and Hispanic-Serving

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69 Id.
Institutions (HSIs) more for credit.\textsuperscript{71} For example, the SBPC study found that Wells Fargo charged a hypothetical community college student borrower over $1,000 more on a $10,000 private loan when compared to a student borrower enrolled at a four-year college.\textsuperscript{72} SBPC’s study also showed that Upstart, a prominent financial technology firm that considers educational data in their lending practices, charged higher interest rates to borrowers depending upon where they attended school; if the student attended an HBCU or HSI, the borrower would be charged much more in interest and fees compared to if they went to New York University.\textsuperscript{73} These discriminatory lending practices are in violation of fair lending laws, including the Equal Credit Opportunity Act (ECOA), which makes it “unlawful for any creditor to discriminate against any applicant, with respect to any aspect of a credit transaction”.\textsuperscript{74}

In 2014, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) brought an enforcement action against Sallie Mae Bank and Navient Solutions, after finding their use of CDR in their credit-scoring model for pricing student loans violated ECOA.\textsuperscript{75} Another 2022 FDIC study revealed a pattern of discrimination in the underwriting process of student loans, and called into question the institutional use of CDR to determine which students could apply for private student loan consolidation and refinancing.\textsuperscript{76} The FDIC found that the use of CDR as a loan eligibility factor resulted in the “disproportionate exclusion” of students who attended HBCUs from applying for credit.\textsuperscript{77} Participants in federal financial aid programs, including schools, private-sector financial firms, and government contractors, are expected to comply with a range of civil rights and fair lending laws.\textsuperscript{78} I call on the Department to leverage its partnership with other agencies such as the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau to support fair lending risk assessments and ensure student lending practices comply with fair lending and civil rights laws.

8. \textbf{Gainful Employment}

The Department’s 2014 “gainful employment” (GE) rules would have helped ensure that college programs adequately prepared students and did not leave them unable to find work and struggling to repay insurmountable debt loads, or otherwise would put the school at risk of losing

\textsuperscript{72} \textit{Id}.
\textsuperscript{73} \textit{Id}.
\textsuperscript{74} \textit{See 15 U.S.C. § 1691 (a)(1) (prohibiting discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion, national origin, sex or marital status, age, because all or part of an applicant's income derives from public assistance, or because the applicant has in good faith exercised any right under the Consumer Credit Protection Act).}
\textsuperscript{78} 15 U.S.C. § 1691 (a)
access to Title IV funding. But the Trump Administration inexplicably rescinded the rule in 2019.

Along with the list of low financial value postsecondary programs that the Department is creating, I applaud the Biden Administration’s plan to revive and strengthen the GE rule,81 which will take the necessary further step of holding non-degree and certificate programs, particularly those at predatory for-profit colleges, accountable. Nevertheless, I am concerned about ongoing delays in its implementation. I recognize the second negotiated rulemaking committee was unable to reach a consensus on proposed regulations for GE, thereby delaying the release of the GE proposal to spring 2023.82 Further delay of the GE rule only will prolong the timeline for when poorly performing institutions could face penalties, exacerbating these institutions’ harmful impact on students who are enrolled in these schools. Therefore, I urge the Department to begin building the infrastructure needed to implement GE as quickly as permissible, and while the Department works to implement this essential piece of its regulatory accountability agenda, I urge the Department to consider using their authorities to ensure that institutions offering low-quality programs are swiftly held accountable to prevent further financial harm to students who may end up with debts that are not affordable relative to their actual incomes.

Conclusion

I am encouraged by The Department’s attention to the need for stronger accountability among institutions of higher education and the steps that the Department already has taken to hold higher institutions accountable for their actions. However, I believe more must be done. The Department should take every opportunity to utilize the authority Congress has given it to ensure that schools are more accountable to students and taxpayers. I appreciate your prompt action to do so.

Sincerely,

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Elizabeth Warren
United States Senator